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The Case Against Specialist Jurisdiction for Labour 
Law: The Philosophical Assumptions of a Common Law 
for Labour Relations 
Nick Wailes* 
The aim of this paper is to outline the philosophical assumptions that form the basis of the 
present call for the abolition of specialist jurisdiction for labour law in New Zealand The 
discussion here focuses on Epstein's (1983a) "A common law for labour ·relations ... " 
because it is the key statement of the case against a specialist jurisdiction, and the 
conclusions he advances have played an important role in the debate about labour law in 
New Zealand While academic literature has been largely critical of the call for the 
abolition of the Employment Court, there have been very few attempts to come to terms 
with the types of arguments used by the "abolitionists''. It is argued that an adequate 
critique needs to be built on an understanding of the philosophical assumptions that are 
driving the current changes in labour relations legislation. 
Introduction 
Current debate about whether to retain or abolish the specialist jurisdiction for labour law 
has increasingly focused on the issue of whether the common law can adequately deal with 
the employment relationship in a general setting. While this line of argument has a long 
history, especially in the United Kingdom leading up to the Trade Disputes Act 1906 {Fox, 
1985 ), the intrusion of a philosophically driven conception of what the common law ought 
to be has fundam~entally recast the tenns of reference for the debate in its contemporary 
form The aim of this article is to provide a ~critique of the key example of the 
"abolitionist" argument, that st~ems from the redefinition of the common law - R.A. 
Epstein's (1983a) "A Common Law for Labour Relations ... " - by examining the 
behavioural .assumptions that accompany such an argument. While it is generally 
acknowledged that Epstein's ideas have had a significant influence in shaping the 
"abolitionist" case (see for example Ryan and Walsh 1993, Anderson 1993, Brook 1990, 
1991 ), there is no comprehensive or satisfactory attempt to provide an understanding of the 
nature of Epstein's argument. What follows is an attempt to fill this lacuna. It is divided 
into four sections. The first briefly reviews the debate about the status of the Employment 
Court. The second summarises Epstein's case for the use of common law principles and 
institutions to deal with employment relations, which fottn the basis of the present call for 
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the abolition of the Employment Court. Section three demonstrates that the philosophical 
assumptions that Epstein brings to his analysis enable him to dismiss many of the c~i~ticisms 
that have been levelled at his analysis. Section four argues that an adequate crtttque of 
Epstein must be founded on an assessm·ent of the philosophical assumptions that he brings 
to his ·work on labour relations - specifically, the theory of self interest and self ownership. 
The debate about the specialist jurisdiction 
In a series of recent articles Walsh and Ryan (Ryan and Walsh 1993, Walsh and Ryan 
1993) have argued that the Employm~ent ·Ccntracts Act (ECA) is theoretically inconsistent. 
In part, they locate this inconsistency in the nature of the policy process by which the E~CA 
was fmalised. Briefly, the fotmation of a new policy making community with strong links 
to employer groups, and like minded interest groups, fed into National's Manifesto aims for 
labour relations reforrn. While this refotm agenda allowed the issues of bargaining and 
representation to be resolved in a fairly straight fotward manner, the nature of the 
institutional structure to accompany these changes continued to be the focus of considerable 
debate. The result was a defeat of the institutional aspects of the "neo-conservative" refot n1 
agenda during the Options paper exercise. Ryan and Walsh (1993) attribute this to the way 
that Department of Labour officials retained control over the crit·eria against which the 
institutional options were to be judged. They argue that as a result of this policy making 
process, the institutional structures which are provided for in the ECA are more in line with 
the pluralistic philosophy of previous labour r·elations legislation than what they call the 
"neo-conservative contractual based theory" that underpins section I & II of the Act1. On 
the basis of this assessment of the policy process, they suggest that the nature of the labour 
relations institutions is the last remaining unfinished business of the process of labour 
market deregulation that has taken place over the last decade. 
Much of the recent concern with the status of the Employment Court is associated with the 
publication of the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation's (Business 
Roundtable/Employers Federation, 1992) joint assessment of the decisions taken by the 
Court. For Ryan and Walsh, it signalled the beginning of a concerted campaign advocating 
the abolition of the Employment Court in favour of civil court jurisdiction. At the time, 
they argued that in the event of a National Govemm~ent being re-elected in the 1992 general 
election, the abolition of the Employment Court would become a serious policy issue. 
However, the initial difficulties for National in securing a majority and more widely, the 
downgrading of "neo-conservative" policy options in the face of the erosion of electoral 
power, seems to have precluded institutional reform in the short term. In fact, it could be 
argued that the "pluralist" aspects of the ECA have been strengthened by the introduction 
of a minimum wage for under twenty year olds. Nevertheless, the Business Roundtable/ 
Employers Federation assessment of the Employment Court clearly signposts an agenda for 
1 
The division of the ECA in to a "neo- conservative"' section (parts I & II) and a pluralistic section 
(parts III & IV) seems to have gained currency because of its neat,ess in analytical tenns. However 
this approach is misleading. In fact the emphasis on freedom of association rather than freedom of 
contract in part I of the Act represents a substantial moderation to Epstein's model which has not 
attracted any attention in the critical literature. The argwnent here is that the failure to come to tenns 
with Epstein ' s argun1ent allows these types of ov,ersight. For a more rigorous assessn1ent of the ECA 
as it n1easures up to Epstein ' s model see Brook 1991 . 
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reform which stems from the same theoretical model as the ECA itself. Thus, there is still 
a need to consider the Business Roundtable/Employers Federation assessment because of 
its implications for future policy reform. 
Moreover, there are a number of important issues r ~ised by the Business Roundtable/ 
Employers Federation document. The fact that the two organisations should publish a 
document together lends considerable support to the view that the Employers Federation has 
become increasingly radicalised over the last eight or nine years (Walsh, 1992; Roper, 
1993). It also seems to reflect that the nature of the Employers Federation has been 
fundamentally altered by the ECA (Carroll ,& Tremewan, 1993). No longer directly 
involved in the bargaining process, it has adopted a position closer to that of the Business 
Roundtable as a lobbying group. 
More interestingly, in the context of the debate about the retention of the specialist 
jurisdiction, the Business Roundtable/Employers Federation assessment retains continuity 
with the position advocated by the Business Roundtable since at least the Green Paper 
process undertaken before the 1987 Labour Relations Act (Business Roundtable, 1986). 
This is summarised by Anderson {1993). He identifies the criticisms of the Employment 
Court with the long standing claims that specialised institutions pay too much attention to 
the content of contracts and have been prepared to read wide ranging implied terms into 
voluntary contracts. Anderson notes that the assumption of this argument is that the civil 
courts would produce judgments that were significantly different than those of the 
Employment Court. This r,eflects a philosophical belief in how the courts ought to function 
rather than the way they actually do function. His conclusion is that the transfer of 
jurisdiction to the civil courts would not result in a significant change in the nature of 
decisions because the civil courts have consistently upheld, and deferr,ed to, the decisions 
of the Labour Court, the predecessor of the Employment Court. The implication is that the 
abolitionist case is one driven by theoretical assumptions derived from theorists like 
Epstein. 'On the basis of this ass,essment, it is important to examine the appropriateness of 
this philosophi,cal model to labour relations legislation in New Z~ealand. 
Epstein's ,common law for labour relations 
The argument put forward by Epstein (1983a) stems from the application of his social and 
political philosophy to the issue of labour relations. These conclusions have typically been 
presented as the entire argument2 . Epstein's broad conclusion is that common law 
principles provide the most appropriate basis on which to regulate employment relationships 
because they are based on a sound understanding of human nature. This section seeks to 
outline the conclusions that Epstein reaches, and that have been subsequently taken up in 
the policy debate about specialist jurisdiction. It attempts to relate these conclusions to the 
behavioural assumptions he brings to his analysis . 
.. 
- A good example is Brook (1990). Her case for the refonn of labour legislation in New Zealand, 
including the abolition of a specialist jurisdiction, is heavily dependent on Epstein· s argument for 
a n1inimal labour statute \vhich gives predominance to common law principles. But it is clear that 
she is not a\vare of the philosophical inconsistencies this creates in her analysis. See Wailes (1993) 
for a n1ore detailed discussion. 
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Epstein defmes the common law as the best set of private law principles that caa be 
to handle the problems of labour relations. It is important to note that this defioitioa 
significantly from the technical defmition used by lawyers to denote the develop•• 
legal precedents from decisions of the courts not gove1ned by statue. Epstein 81J1111 
given his alternative definition, the law of property and tort establish the fram.....-k. 
original rights in which voluntary transactions can take place. The benefit of 
approach, Epstein believes, is that it is capable of sustained application across a wide 
of different specific cases. Added to this is the liberal principle that conbacts are of 
benefit to both parties in the transaction regardless of original entidenaems. Suclt a 
libertarian framework, Epstein argues, is capable of dealing with all the issues tbat · · 
any situation of voluntary transactions between individuals who are self &a&·. 
He argues that the common law, so defmed, creates legal entidements among 
without reference to personal status. He asserts that, apart from "unfortunate early m,~taaioa 
with the law of criminal conspiracy", the common law proper took a very sound palitioa 
in regulating employment relationships in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It \VII 
in this period that the common law proper most closely approximated Epstein's mocW of 
how it ought to function because of the widespread application of contract law to 
employment matters. The strength of such an approach, Epstein asse.tts, is that it is hued 
on the view that "every person owns his own person and can possess, use aad of 
his labour on whatever terms he sees fit" (1983a:l364). Further, this of 
entitlements asserts that the right to disposition allows the specification of the 
obligations that accompany the right to offer one's labour unhindered. Over die 
original distribution of wealth is likely to change as labour is exchanged for leisure or for 
capital and, within this framework, no limitation is placed on the voluntary · ~ 
of entitlements thus established. 
Therefore, he argues that the decision to become an employer or an e•nployee is a 
private act, and cannot be the occasion for the increase of state regulation of private 
transactions. Rather, the role of the state is limited to ensuring the faithful eaforcea.t of 
the voluntary agreements reached by individuals. Further, the identity of the palies to 
voluntary transactions should be of no special concern of the state. Therefore, if · are 
fornted voluntarily, without the use or threat of force, fraud or inducen•ent to laleacb 
contract, they are easily integrated into the framework of a general theory of 
Epstein demonstrates the usefulness of this model by applying it to a number of 
cases related to labour relations. First, he argues that within this framework IJ'C not 
regarded as a criminal conspiracy and that the framework of tort law provides the 
in which they can legitimately act in constraint of trade. For this reason, he argues the 
closed shop can be accommodated within a common law framework provided that it the 
outcome of a voluntary transaction. Secondly, he suggests that the same lo&ic to 
the yellow dog contract because a voluntary agreement within the limits of tbat by 
the common law must be accorded respect regardless of its content. The fact tbat 
ar~ above zero and that differentials in wages exist between workers, for Epstein, · 
evtdence that workers do not have unequal bargaining power or rather, that 
of bargaining power are unimportant, because the contract is of mutual beaefit 1o 
and employees. Further, he argues that those who support the of 
contract are confusing economic inequality with duress, which would imply that d 
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involved duress. Workers have the choice to retain their contract with their union and seek 
employment elsewhere. This conclusion is not moderated by utilitarian considerations 
because workers that accept yellow dog contracts will demand some compensation for 
giving up the gains of union ·membership. A third issue that Epstein addresses is that of 
picketing. He distinguishes two aspects of picketing - the threat to use force and the 
attempt to convey infotmation. He argues that the threat to use force is covered by the law 
of assault, and whil~e the attempt to convey info11nation is legal, it is better to ~extend too 
much protection to the rights of others than too little in a situation where the two aspects 
are intertwined. Finally, he argues that there is no such thing as the right to strike because 
this involves the breach of contract. It is notable that the lockout, for Epstein, is 
analytically different from a strike, because the worker has the option to seek alternative 
employment, wher~eas an employer cannot easily take his/her production ~elsewhere. 
On tbe basis of a sustained critique of the provisions of the United States' National Labour 
Relations (Wagner) Act, Epstein's m~in conclusion is that the common law, as he defmes 
it, because of the simplicity of its procedures and principles, is well equipped to deal with 
the nature of labour relations. This is because the principles of his common law correspond 
to a situation in which the natural self interest of those involved is not m~ediated by other 
concerns. The extension of this argument is that ther~e is no need for a specialist labour law 
of any type, other than a minimal ~code which merely states the common law principles that 
ought to guide approaches to employment relationships. Also it implies that there is no 
need for an institution that has expertise in labour matters because the theory of entitlements 
allows the unproblematic application of the general principl~es of property, tort and contract 
to labour matters, which are simply issues of property rights. For this reason, Epstein's 
approach is commonly called a general law approach. 
In a later paper (1984a) Epstein argues for the return of the contract at will doctrine. He 
summarises the case against the contract at will as one which assumes that the structure of 
the labour market leaves employees vulnerable to coer~cion and exploitation in a situation 
where employers are arbitrarily able to end contracts. Given his view that the employment 
relationship is simply an issue of property rights, he rejects this ,assessment. While Epstein 
admits that contract at will is not ideal for ~every employment relationship, be argues that 
the parties should have the right to adopt this form of contract if they wish, and that this 
form should be implied in the absence of a specific agreement. For Epstein, the contract 
at will is important because it respects the freedom of individuals to negotiate on whatever 
terms they see fit. He also argues that the contract at will empowers both employers and 
employees to ensure that they obtain mutual benefit during the whole period of the 
employment relationship. He asserts that because either party has the power to end the 
·COntract at any time, the contract at will operates as a powerful constraint against th~e abuse 
of the relationship by one party or another. It is this argument, taken together with his 
entitlement theory, which points to what Epstein means by "a" common law for labour 
relations - it is a specific view of how the ~common law ought to function based on 
philosophical principles of human action. He is not referring to the common law as it is 
understood in its technical legal sense. 
The recent "abolitionist" case in New Zealand has made substantial use of these ideas. The 
Business Roundtable has consistently maintained that the employment relationship should 
be dealt with according to contractual notions and that these are best addressed in the 
• 
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setting of the civil courts, under the auspices of a simplified common law basecl 
theory of individual entitlements. Furtherrnore, many of the features pfEpstein' s • 
law for labour relations" can be identified in the provisions of the ECA with its • .. 
on contractual arrangements between individual employers and employees. The 
Roundtable/Employers Federation ( 1992) assessment of the operation of the Employaeat 
Court is underpinned by a clear agenda for the abolition of the Employment Court ia liae 
with the philosophical conclusions of Epstein's model. 
The importance of these ideas in New Zealand's contemporary labour relations raises the 
question what are the behavioural assumptions that drive Epstein's model? There ae two 
aspects of Epstein's presentation of labour relations which relate to the way he 
human action. Firstly, he argues that in employment relationships humans act to m • ise 
their self interest and the correspondence of common law, as he defmes it, to this self 
interest makes it the best possible basis on which to regulate employment relationabips. 
Secondly, he believes that the choice to become an employer or an employee is a strictly 
private one based on the individual preference for risk. Section four argues that these two 
claims are closely connected and stem from Epstein's philosophy of human action. A third 
claim that Epstein makes is that individuals own their labour and can use it as they frt, 
within the limits of common law principles (which detetmine legality and capacity). 
Combined with the theory of self interest, Epstein believes that this notion of self ownership 
renders criticisms of his common law for labour relations meaningless. 
Epstein and the pluralist critique 
Epstein has been the subject of a number of criticisms from industrial lawyers in the United 
States. Broadly, these critiques have focused on two issues. Firstly, it is argued that 
Epstein presents the common law as if it was unchanging and that this is a major tlaw in 
his argument. Getman and Kohler (1983) argue that this presentation masks the limited 
time period in which contract doctrine governed the employment relationship. They argue 
that the labour relations legislation that Epstein is so hostile to represents a · 
of the traditional master and servant legal fottns that dominated employment law before the 
intellectual experiment of using contract law. A second and related criticism is put forward 
by Verkuil (1983) who argues that Epstein misrepresents the way in which the COIDIDOillaw 
has dealt with employment relationships in the period when the contract doctrine operated 
and, therefore, he fails to understand the reason that the employment relationship was taken 
away from the jurisdiction of the common law courts. 
However in a reply ( 1983b ), Epstein dismisses these objections as misguided.. He 
recognises the weakness of the pluralist position - it is essentially empirical and doee aot 
have a clear theoretical base. More importantly, in this context, he rejects the view that 
how the common law has functioned in the past is of any relevance to what be 
Epstein is not only interested in repealing the Wagner Act (and by extension 
jurisdiction for labour law generally) but also in purifying the common law 
intrusions that do not directly relate to the theory of entitlements outlined above. 
the way in which the common law proper has dealt with the employment relationship 
to the development of contract is not his concern. Rather, he argues that those an the 
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( 1983b: 143 5). By itself the criterion of workability has no normative validity - unless they 
are prepared to establish a theoretical basis for pragmatism. Furthennore, in line with his 
view that contract law is closely related to human nature, Epstein ( 1980) does in fact argue 
that the common law should be static around the theory of entitlements, therefore rejecting 
the importance of accounts of how the common law has functioned. Epstein is not 
interested in h0w the common law has functioned but rather how it should function. 
A second attempt to establish the basis for a specialist jurisdiction is put foJWard by 
Anderson (1993) . He distinguishes two separate aspects of a defence of specialist 
jurisdiction. He acknowledges that a pragmatic view, advanced by Ryan and Walsh, which 
focuses simply on the factual nature of employment disputes cannot by itself provide the 
case for a specialist jurisdiction as opposed to a specialised division of the High Court. 
Therefore, the case for the retention of the Employment Court needs to be founded on the 
nature of employment law. He dismisses the view that since the passing of the ECA, 
employment law has been subsumed into the general Jaw of contract because this leaves no 
sufficiently specialist field of labour law to allow the retention of a specialist jurisdiction. 
Rather, he argues that employment law can be sufficiently differentiated from general law 
to justify specialist institutions. This view concentrates on the differences between legal 
forms and employment relations . He argues that common law is inherently individualistic 
and, as such, conflicts with the collective nature of industrial relations. Further, he believes 
that legal structures are adversarial and not well suited to reaching agreements between 
parties in an ongoing relationship. Therefore, Anderson suggests that employment 
relationship should be dealt with in an institutional setting which meets the following 
criteria of effectiveness - adequate provisions for proven violations of disputes of rights, 
relative speed, costs to the parties and the state, access by individual workers, and the 
perceptions of the parties directly involved. These criteria suggest the development of 
modes of legal reasoning rooted in the particular character of the employment relationship. 
Anderson argues that the contract form is an artificial legal ~construct which is not well 
suited to the nature of employment because it differs significantly from other commercial 
contracts. He, therefore, provides a theoretical basis for the workability thesis put forward 
by Ryan and Walsh. 
This is an elegant argument but it does not by itself provide a basis on which to critique 
Epstein, and by extension the case put forward by the Business Roundtable and the 
Employers Federation for abolition of the specialist jurisdiction. Anderson does not 
adequately deal with the fact that Epstein's manifest assumption is that the employment 
relationship should be dealt with by contract law, and should indeed be treated as if it were 
any other commercial contract or property relation. Nor does he provide a satisfactory 
critique of Epstein's view that the employment relationship is best dealt with by a theory 
of entitlements because it equates most closely to human nature. Therefore, to be able to 
critique the present call for the abolition of the Employment Court, it is important to 
exan1ine the nature of the behavioural assumptions underpinning Epstein's analysis. 
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Self interest and self ownership 
The implicit assumption of the Business Roundtable/Employers Federation assessment of 
the Employment Court is that the pluralist assumptions that have underpinned labour 
relations legislation, and fonn the basis for the ~criticisms discussed above, cannot be 
sustained in the face of Epstein's model . It is from this position that they suggest that the 
Employment Court's specialist jurisdiction is at odds, not only with the intention of the 
ECA, but also a sound understanding of how individuals behave. However, those who wish 
to draw these conclusions must accept Epstein's socio-biological and neo-liberal behavioural 
assumptions. This section argues that these behavioural assumptions are extremely 
problematic and any analysis based on them is seriously flawed. 
How can Epstein claim that "the decision to become an employer or an employee is an 
entirely private one" ( 1983a: 1366) based on individual preference for risk? It is this 
statement which disarms much of the pluralist critique because it denies the fundamental 
assumption that there is an imbalance of power in the employment relationship and that this 
is the source of conflict in the workplace. However, Epstein's ~claim is not ,an 
unproblematic notion. Rather it represents the summary of a complex set of behavioural 
assumptions which need to be examined further. 
Epstein ( 1990) stresses that the most important features of human action, in most situations, 
are best understood by the theory of self-interest. He argues that the normative basis of 
social and political philosophy ought to be derived from this positive (descriptive) 
observation. Epstein' s self interest thesis can be summarised as follows. In a wide variety 
of human activities, human action is best explained not by using social categories but rather 
by concentrating on biological factors. He argues that what is particular to humans, and 
therefore what constitutes their nature, is that they will maximise their self interest within 
certain moral, legal and social ~constraints . This he believes follows from the selection of 
the genotypes whi~ch maXimise self interest as a means of survival. He moderates this 
"standard model of self interest" with a number of devices, such as inclusive fitness & 
imperfect obligation3, but argues that in a situation of voluntary exchange between 
strangers, as in the employment relationship, a standard model of self interest most 
accurately predicts behaviour. ~On the basis of this fottnulation, Epstein attempts to assess 
the normative implications of self interest - distingui~hing the constant and variable features 
of human nature in order to determine the social arrangements that hold the greatest long 
term social advantage. This "'requires an understanding of the interaction between the self 
interest constant and diverse natural endowments" (1990: 103). He argues that the 
persistence of self interest and variations in preferences is the strongest justification for the 
use of a decentralised system of property allocation, and therefore a common law regime 
based on these principles. 
Using the biological derivation of self interest and the argument that (genetic) diversity 
produces differences in preferences and tastes for risk, he is able to argue that some 
3 
"Inclusive Fitness holds that all organisms act to maximise not only their individual fitness, but the 
fitness of their entire genetic line as well" ( Epstein, 1990: 102 at footnote 2). This is a device that 
Epstein takes from social biology as a means of dealing with the difficulties that a simple egoistic 
assumption poses for his analysis. Imperfect obligation refers to religious belief. caring activity, etc. 
• 
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produces differences in preferences and tastes for risk, he is able to 1lllt 
individuals assume the nature of employees and others of employers dependius oa d • 
initial (biological) endowments. The fact that an employer has a higher for rilk 
him/her to have a greater say over the decisions in the business. Unlike Noziak (1974). 
Epstein acknowledges that voluntary exchanges generate negative extelnatitiea, but 
that these are reduced as voluntary exchanges become routine for broad c~ af 
transactions. Therefore, a common law for labour relations allows for predictability ud 
reduces externalities from exchange. Further, he argues that a system on priwte 
property and individual liberty will generate the closest approximation to the 0J11iaa81 
social contract, given natural differences in preferences that cannot be measured. 
There are a number of probleans with Epstein's theory of self interest which · doub1l 
about its usefulness. Epstein's model stenas from the application of socio-biology to bia 
social and political philosophy. Rosenburg ( 1988) argues that for socio-biology to have aay 
no1mative influence there are two key issues it has to address. First, it must show tJuat the 
naturalistic fallacy4 can be overcome by demonstrating how a purely factual of 
organisms can "underwrite their status as agents or loci of intrinsic value" (ibid:ll). 
Secondly, if this can be achieved, it must show that this propaty is common, and · 
to, all humans so that it will count as constituting our nature. This is exactly what 
tries to do. He deliberately ignores the critiques of Moore and Hume, and explicitly seeb 
to derive "ought" from "is". He uses the biological coDStant of self · to the 
second condition. However, Rosenburg argues that models that use socio-biolo&Y t 
satisfy this condition because its underlying tenet is that there is no such propaty co llli'·.t I 
and peculiar to each member of the species (Wilson, 1975), nther they req11ire V8iatioa 
both within and between species. Therefore, it is not clear that the idea of a 
residual is consistent with a socio-biological methodology. 
In the absence of being able to establish any direct no1mative importance, Rolenbura 
that the most that can be expected from these types of models is to tell a plaulible ltoiy, 
but questions the value of such an exercise. In effect Epstein's model confroldl the aaeDe 
fallacy - to infer that a particular no1mative conclusion is right or well gronncled a 
purely causal account of its origins. Epstein's model of self· therefore, is ....-y 
limited in its ability to underpin notmative conclusions. Given the role biological 
foundations play in Epstein's work on labour relations, it is important to an 
alternative evaluation of self interest. 
Lewontin et al. (1982) argue that models like the one being considered here the •eel 
for bourgeois society to explain continued inequalities that exist in capitalism. s 
work on labour relations seeks to justify, or dismiss as unimpo1t•nt, the · 
exist in employment relations. They argue that "the ideology of CXJUIIity has """'- a 
weapon for, rather than a weapon against, a society of inequality by the -
of the inequality from the structure of society to the nature of individuals" (1982:5). is 
possible to situate this project in Epstein's work. He the inequaliti• dial 
between individuals in te1 ms of the process of natural selection, but at the ume time 
The naturalistic fallacy was first identified by G. Moore in 1903 aod appHcs to •any t11at 
purports to de~ive a nonnative conclusion from purely factual (Bullock et al .• 1918). 
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the common law principle of not considering the positions of the parties to a contract, 
independent of the functioning of that contract. 
Epstein's self interest thesis conforms to the three features of a biologically det~ettninistic 
argument. He locates inequality in the genetic inheritance of the individual. Thus he 
attributes an intrinsic merit and ability to those who ar~e better off, in this case employers. 
Secondly, because merit and ability are coded for in an individual's genes they are passed 
from generation to generation. Lewontin et a/. argue that this construction confuses the two 
meanings of inheritance - monetary and genetic, legitimising the passage of social power 
from generation to generation. Thirdly, Epstein uses the pr~esence of genetic differences to 
explain the dev~elopment of hierarchical stru~ctures as natural . In doing so, Epstein falsely 
equates innate with unchanging and wrongly assumes that he can overcome the naturalistic 
fallacy . 
The second behavioural assumption that Epstein r~elies on is that of self ownership. The 
key to his argum~ent that the ~common law, as he defines it, can effectively deal with the 
employment relationship is his ability to assum~e that ~everybody owns their own labour, and 
can dispose of it as they s~ee fit. In other words he seeks to r~educe employment to a matter 
of exchanges of property rights. This view runs counter to the pluralist position that labour 
is not simply a factor of production. Brook (1990), who relies heavily on Epstein, argues 
that to say that labour is a ~commodity is simply to say that it has value. This model can 
be characterised as one which is structur~ed around a Lockean "person"'. Epstein, in relying 
on self ownership, places the ideal-typical "person" developed by Locke at the heart of his 
argument. Levine (1988) argues that the profound changes associated with the development 
of capitalism in the seventeenth century required the development of ideal-typical types to 
act as both a spur to adoption of capitalism and to justify the inequalities that capitalism 
produced. MacPherson (1962) argues that Locke's great achievement was to justify 
continued inequality in the face of a founal equality, and that th~e means by which he did 
this was in arguing that each individual owned his or her own labour. This is because self 
ownership is not inconsistent with the right to alienate one's labour in return for a wage, 
thus justifying unequal property as a natural feature that exists prior to the fo1 1nation of 
civil society. Because, to partake in capitalism, individuals had to hav~e initial endowments, 
Locke's ideal typical type assigned (differential) initial ~endowments to the (pr~e-social) stat~e 
of nature. Epstein uses socio-biology to construct these pre-social differences. Levine 
argues that this formulation is inherently pro-capitalist and excludes any notion of inequality 
from the analysis, because inequities are seen as a function of nature and not soci~ety. 
Therefore, Epstein's use of self ownership allows him to claim that there is no inequality 
in the employment relationship. 
Furthermore, even given the general probletns associated with using a Lockean person, 
there are a number of specific problems with the way Epstein uses and ~constructs this ideal 
typical type that undermine his behavioural ,assumptions. These will be dealt with briefly 
here. The first problem with Epstein's use of the Lockean person is that he ~employs this 
device on the basis of weak informational constraints about the slope of preferences, rather 
than on the basis of moral apriorism, as Nozick (1974) d'Jes. This creates significant 
confusion in his argument. Epstein ,excludes the state from having a useful role in (inter 
alia) regulating the ~employment relationship because it lacks the necessary information 
about the s.lope of preferences of individuals, but does not exclude this possibility in theory. 
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about the slope of preferences of individuals, but does not exclude this posaibility ia 
Therefore, his reversion to a Lockean fo11nation is a secondary device. 
analysis then proceeds from a position which assumes the existence of the inclividull 
to the social - thus assuming that the Lockean person is primary. 
A second, and related problem, is Epstein's reconstruction of the status of 
the Lockean framework. Locke argued that individuals had the right to the of 
labour as long as there was as much and as good left for oth&s. However, as Epatea -
(1984c) in a world of scarcity, this condition is impossible to satisfy. He, -
a welfare constraint - notmally known as a Lockean proviso. The appropriation of· 
resources, generated through self interest, does not affect the welfare of others they 
are not accessible to others. However, external appropriation is more prob 
as he has already acknowledged scarcity prevents satisfaction of the sufficiency priaciple. 
He attempts to overcome this by arguing that the extension of voluntary · limits 
the welfare losses associated with external appropriation. However, it is not at all tUt 
self ownership necessarily implies justifiable control over extetnal resources, except whem 
it is already assumed that a capitalist market exists and that this is just. Cohen (1985 & 
1986) demonstrates that even where individuals are self owning, joint control of ~ 
resources can result in a just distribution. This is contrary to Epstein's implicit 
that self ownership necessitates a hierarchical social structure. Broadly, the slalUI of self 
ownership in Epstein's model is uncertain and confused, and the logical · that 
he claims for his analysis of labour relations relies on badly constructed behavioural 
assumptions. 
Conclusion: a common law for labour relations? 
The conclusions that follow from this discussion pose some saious the 
usefulness of Epstein's "common law for labour relations" u the theoretical 
for changes in labour legislation in New Zealand. Epstein's for the aboJilia of a 
specialist jurisdiction and the application of common law principles, u he defin• -...., to 
the employment relationship rest on a set of radical behavioural · Thilllticle 
has demonstrated a number of key features about Epstein's argument It his that 
Epstein's case for the abolition of the specialist jurisdiction upon the theail of self 
interest and self ownership. It has been shown that these behavioural assumptimw ClllllOt 
be sustained. Specifically, the theory of self interest confronts the natunliltie lallacJ. 
Without notmative status, it simply operates in a detetaninistic fashion to exclucle 
from Epstein's analysis. Also, the use of the Lockean person is collfused both ia 11111 
and its construction. The implication of this critique is that abolition of the Bmplo,aent 
Court, and the application of the common law principles that · to 
employment relations, are likely to have adverse effects on 
initial endowments. 
However, as has been noted, Epstein's model represents not only a call for the 
the specialist jurisdiction, but also a complete redefmition of the common law · 
it can be expected that a transferral of jurisdiction to the High Court would aot · 
alter the nature of the decisions that the Business Roundtable and ......... 
I 
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generally, the logic of the argument against a specialist jurisdiction for labour law is not 
separate or different to the logic underpinning the Employment Contracts Act as a whole. 
This suggests that the behavioural assumptions that underpin the ECA are derived from a 
radical model of entitlements not capable of dealing with employment relationships. The 
extent to which the ECA deviates from the model put forward by Epstein means that there 
is still space for further radical refo1n1 of labour relations in New Zealand. Currently, the 
view is that the avenue of refotm is limited only to the institutional structure of the ECA. 
This view may need to be modified. 
Finally, those who wish to advocate the retention of a specialist jurisdiction for labour law 
need to go back to frrst principles by outlining the behavioural assumptions that underpin 
a pluralist model of labour relationships. Attempts by Ryan and Walsh and by Anderson 
point the way for such a re-examination. However, this cannot be done in isolation from 
a critique of the Employment Contracts Act as a whole. 
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